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In 2013, the tuna fishery in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean (WCPO) was valued at approximately 
US$6.3 billion, calculated from a catch of 2.614 mil-
lion metric tonnes.1 The majority of the tuna catch 
was taken by the purse seine fishery that targets 
skipjack tuna destined for the canned tuna market. 
A high proportion of the WCPO tuna catch is 
taken within the national waters of the Parties to the 
Nauru Agreement (PNA). The PNA is a sub-regional 
group, established under the Nauru Agreement 
Concerning Cooperation in the Management of 
Fisheries of Common Interest (Nauru Agreement) 
in 1982. Its membership includes the Federated 
States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Marshall Islands, 
Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, 
and Tuvalu. The PNA group is located within the 
equatorial belt of the WCPO between 10 degrees 
north and 10 degrees south longitude as shown 
in Figure 1. This In Brief discusses how regional 
co-operation has served the PNA group in promoting 
their interests whilst adhering to the international 
rules/requirements to conserve the key fish stocks. 
The Nauru Agreement was a response by a group 
of Pacific Island states to take advantage of the oppor-
tunities following the establishment and endorsement 
of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) concept under 
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS). The EEZ is defined in Article 57 of 
the UNCLOS as an area that ‘shall not extend beyond 
200 nautical miles from the baselines from which 
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured’, and 
the coastal states have sovereign rights over this. The 
establishment of the EEZ concept effectively extends 
the rights of the coastal states and, in particular, PNA 
states, to areas that were regarded as high seas and 
free for all. By working together and co-operating in 
the management of their fisheries zones, it was hoped 
that the citizens of these countries would receive max-
imum benefits from the tuna resources harvested.  
At the time the Nauru Agreement was estab-
lished, the majority of the PNA states had just 
obtained their political independence or were in 
the process of attaining it. Thus, as relatively young 
states, surrounded by a vast area of ocean, was seen 
as an opportunity to capitalise on the fishing resourc-
es extended under the UNCLOS . However, while the 
PNA states were able to declare the EEZs, capitalising 
the opportunities was not as easy as it may have been 
anticipated. Simply put, the PNA states did not have 
the capacity at the time to enter or participate in the 
fishery nor the capacity to effectively negotiate with 
the distant fishing partners.
Since 1982, the PNA group has introduced a num-
ber of instruments to be implemented at national levels. 
Each contributes to the Nauru Agreement’s objec-
tive of maximising the benefits from the tuna fishery 
resources. Standing in the way are hinderences such as 
geographic location, physical infrastructure, depend-
ency on development assistance, and the capacity to 
maximise the benefits from the tuna fishery. Despite 
these challenges, the PNA states have strengthened 
through co-operation, evident in its ability to set the 
rules of operations for the tuna fishery in the PNA 
region.2 These rules include the Minimum Terms and 
Conditions for Access, which are agreed at the region-
al level and implemented at the national level. 
The PNA states and the PNA group have 
faced considerable challenges in implementing the 
rules and measures they have adopted over the 
last 30 years. However, as they continue to assert 
their sovereign rights and become more strategic 
in their efforts, the PNA states have increasingly 
taken control of their tuna fishery. In recent years, 
the PNA group has established two fundamental 
measures that have changed the dynamics and the 
way the ‘game’ in the tuna fishery is played. These 
measures include the adoption and implementation 
of the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS) effective in late 
2007 and the Third Implementing Arrangements for 
Nauru Agreement effective from January 2010. 
The VDS limits the number of fishing days as a 
way of control fishing effort. Under the VDS, each 
PNA state is allocated a number of days (Parties Allo-
cated Effort). These days are then allocated by the 
PNA states to their fishing partners. Since the estab-
lishment of the measure, the PNA states have set a 
benchmark price on access.3 The current benchmark 
price for a fishing day is US$6,000 effective from Janu-
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ary 2014. A further increase to US$8,000 per fishing 
day has been approved to be effective in 2015. 
Under the Third Implementing Arrangement 
(3IA) measure, the PNA states use licensing condi-
tions to as-sert their control over the tuna fishery. 
A fundamental aspect under the 3IA is the closure 
of high seas pockets surrounding the PNA national 
waters. As stipulated under Article 87 of the UNCLOS, 
the high seas areas are free for all. However, under 
the 3IA measure, the high seas pockets adjacent to 
the EEZs of the PNA states are closed to the licensed 
vessels. Given the contiguous EEZs of the PNA group 
(see Figure 1), it is not economically feasible for the 
fishing fleets to operate solely in the high seas area, 
and therefore access to the EEZs is necessary. 
Co-operation has served the PNA well over the 
years. There were a number of challenges along the 
way, but the group has progressed nonetheless. How-
ever, as the member states continue to further defined 
their national interests, there is a need to look at 
options to further harness the co-operation of the 
PNA group and to maintain their solidarity. Further, 
the ideals that facilitated the establishment of the 
Nauru Agreement in 1982 have certainly changed. 
Some of the members have become flag states as they 
become active participants in the tuna fishery, while 
others continue to prefer bilateral access agreements. 
One option that may be considered is the establish-
ment of a compensation mechanism. Under this 
mechanism, any state that is adversely impacted as 
result of implementing a PNA established measure/
instrument is compensated by the group for any loss 
or burden experienced. This is to ensure that all PNA 
states adopt the regionally agreed measures in order 
to maintain the control they have achieved to date. 
Without a compensating mechanism, the implemen-
tation of the PNA measures may be staggered and 
their effectiveness may not be as anticipated. 
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1 Source: Forum Fisheries Agency.
2 The PNA region is the combination of all EEZs of the 
PNA membership. It includes the pockets of high seas 
adjacent to Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Nauru, Kiribati, 
and Tuvalu. 
3 The VDS benchmark price is for the purse seine fishery.
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